The EU as an actor at the WTO: its strengths and weaknesses throughout history by Rosana GARCIANDÍA GARMENDIA & Romualdo BERMEJO GARCÍA
EASTERN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES   Volume 3, Issue 1, June  2012      49 
 
 
The EU as an actor at the WTO: 
its strengths and weaknesses throughout history 
 
Romualdo BERMEJO GARCÍA
*, Rosana GARCIANDÍA 
GARMENDIA
** 
 
 
Abstract 
 
During the last decade, many reforms took place in the European Union legal and 
policy framework. Some of those reforms were motivated by the participation of 
the European Union and its member States in the World Trade Organization. This 
paper  aims  to  analyze  the  role  of  the  European  Union  as  an  actor  in  that 
organization, paying special attention to its mixed legal nature – EU and Member 
States.  With  that  purpose,  the  evolution  of  the  relationship  between  the  EU 
member States and the EU itself as simultaneous actors at the WTO is studied. The 
division of competences is also reviewed. Finally, the analysis of the EU position 
in  different  negotiation  rounds  (Uruguay,  Doha)  for  the  agricultural  sector  is 
reviewed as an example of the evolution in the protection of European interests. 
The paper shows that some changes in the Treaty of Lisbon have strengthened the 
legal framework for the EU to be heard with a unique voice in the WTO.  
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1. Introduction  
The aim of the continuous reforms of the European Union Common Trade 
Policy has been to protect the common interests of the Union and the individual 
interests of its member States. Agriculture, services and commodities are only a 
few of the sectors regulated within that framework. Nevertheless, the European 
action for protection of those interests is subject to limits. EU Law and the values 
and principles established in the treaties and the ECJ jurisprudence are the first 
limits to be respected, but not the only ones. One of the most important sets of 
limits that must be observed is derived from an international commitment: the 
decision made by the European member States that the EU would be part of the 
GATT  and  WTO  agreements.  Membership  in  that  organization,  whose  main 
objective  is  to  establish  rules  that  promote  trade  liberalization,  forces  the  EU 
Common Trade Policy to respect those rules. 
Participation of the EU in the WTO sets out many challenges from the legal 
perspective. In the early days of the international trade system, EU member States 
were  contracting  parties  to  the  GATT.  Later  on,  the  European  Communities 
became a de facto member that would be officially recognized as such by all other 
WTO  contracting  parties.  Coexistence  of  the  European  Communities  and  EU 
member States as actors at the WTO built a complex scenario for negotiations. 
Who was the main actor? Could a EU member State vote against the position that 
the  European  Communities  adopted  in  a  particular  negotiation?  Before  a 
negotiation, was there a previous agreement among EU member States in order to 
establish a common position? Was that position binding to all EU member States? 
This parallel membership brought many problems. 
After the adoption of an agreement, that coexistence was also problematic. 
The nature of those agreements has been described as mixed and had particular 
legal effects. 
In  general,  other  WTO  contracting  parties  accepted  this  double 
membership. However, the EU law evolution recently led to the recognition of the 
EU international legal personality, and to the creation of the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the European External 
Action Service. Those changes seem to be motivated by the will of the EU to 
speak with one voice at the international level. The division of competencies has 
also experienced some changes.  
This new framework invites to study the extent to which these changes will 
contribute to achieve that goal regarding international trade and the WTO, and also 
to check whether it is the most adequate framework for the values and objectives 
of the EU in the field. 
From the policy perspective, negotiations have taken place in many different 
sectors such as agriculture, services or intellectual property. Along those negotiations, 
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the positions maintained by the EU in the past and recent rounds in the agricultural 
sector will give us an idea of possible trends for the future. 
  All the above-mentioned challenges are a matter of great concern since, as 
figures show, the EU is one of the main actors of the WTO. The share of the EU in 
world total exports for 2011 represented 15.06%, and the share in world total 
imports 16.54%
1.  
Taking into account those facts, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
key aspects of this special relationship with many different characters: the  EU, EU 
member  States,  the WTO  as  an  international  organization,  and  other WTO 
contracting parties. 
With that purpose, the methodology first aims to analyze history and 
normative changes, and then to study the practice based on the use of those norms, 
in order to state the role of the EU at the WTO. The paper is divided in three 
sections. In the first one, the nature of the EU as an actor at the WTO is analyzed, 
especially reflecting on the changes determined by the Treaty of Lisbon and how 
they affect the role of the EU in international trade.  
The  second  section  focuses  on  the  different  kinds  of  competencies 
recognized  in  European  Union  law  and  jurisprudence.  The  division  of 
competencies related to trade is studied in order to determine which of them 
belongs to the EU or to European member States. The legal effects of such a 
division are of great relevance. 
The last section revises the position of the EU in the main negotiation 
rounds in the WTO for the agricultural sector, in order to detect the extent to  which 
it has been coherent and protective of the interests of the EU and its member 
States.  
 
2. The EU and its member states: simultaneous actors at the WTO? 
International Organizations are generally conformed by sovereign States. 
That is the case of the OECD, the OPEC, the IMF or of the most universal 
organization: the United Nations. Nevertheless, non-state actors are increasingly 
recognized  as  members  of  international  organizations. These  non-state actors 
might be civil society organizations (NGOs) or supranational entities. That is the 
case of the European Union, whose role at the international level experienced a 
very interesting evolution in the last decade. This evolution is especially striking 
in  the  case  of  international  trade.  In  the  last  forty  years,  the  WTO  and  its 
members  have  witnessed  the  emergence  of  a  new  actor  among  them:  the 
European Union.  
The emergence of the EU as an actor is of particular interest, since it does 
not mean the end of the European States’ membership of the WTO. They have 
not  lost  their  status  as  contracting  parties  in  that  organization.  This  parallel 
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membership has caused some problems that will be described in the following 
paragraphs. In methodological terms, the review of the EU performance at the 
WTO throughout history  will  be  used  as the basis to  understand the  current 
strengths and weaknesses that need to be highlighted today. 
 
2.1. First steps: membership at the GATT 
The creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 was the 
first  challenge  for  its  six  member  States,  who  were  at  the  same  time  WTO 
contracting parties
2. The ECSC Treaty set up neither a free -trade area, nor a 
custom union, under the terms of article XXIV of the GATT. It just aimed at 
achieving a common market for the two commodities. However,  that purpose 
would imply actions that could eventually violate certain obligations under the 
GATT. Therefore, the six ECSC member States requested a waiver from some of 
those obligations in order to fulfill their duties under the ECSC Treaty (Hilf, 
Jacobs, Petersmann, 1986). Those waivers were accepted by the other GATT 
contracting parties, by the November 10, 1952 decision. And a new kind of 
informal membership was inaugurated.  
Based on the aforementioned decision, the High Authority of the ECSC 
was present at negotiations regarding coal and steel products, in the Geneva 
Round (1956), the Dillon Round (1960), and the Kennedy Round (1964). In fact, 
the Geneva Protocol to the General Agreement, containing the results of the 
Kennedy Round, made concessions to  the ECSC countries as a group for the 
first time
3. This established a precedent in the WTO practice that would serve as 
the basis for recognition of the EEC as a “special” member, at least de facto. 
The process by which the EEC started to be considered an actor at the 
WTO  began  in  1956,  when  the  EEC  Treaty  was  negotiated.  Aware  of  the 
relevance of fulfilling the GATT obligations, the ECSC States manifested their 
commitment  to  communicate  the  content  of  the  EEC  Treaty  to  the  GATT 
contracting parties prior to its ratification
4. This attitude of compromise shows 
how European States conceived the EEC project: as an autonomous part of the 
international community respectful with regard to international commitments. 
The GATT and liberalization of trade were suppor ted internationally and had 
been working for a decade. European States knew that, for the EEC project to be 
successful, respect of international obligations was needed.  
                                                 
2 Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Germany and Italy were members of the European 
Coal and Steel Community. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and United Kingdom 
were parties to the GATT since 1948. Denmark, Greece and Italy became parties in 1950. 
Germany became a party to the GATT in 1951. 
3 See GATT, “Legal Instruments Embodying the Results of the 1964-1967 Trade Conference, 
Schedule XL bis- Member States of the ECSC”, vol. IV, p. 3065. 
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In  that  sense,  communication of the  content  of  the EEC Treaty  to  the 
GATT contracting parties (March 1957) firmly declared the European intention 
to  fulfill  obligations  derived  from  GATT.  In  that  declaration,  Baron  Snoy 
d’Oppuers stated that “as long as the six would remain contracting parties to the 
General Agreement they would scrupulously observe their obligations under this 
Agreement”
5. He also pointed out, in the same declaration, that the EEC Treaty 
“shall  be  implemented  in  conformity  with  the  General Agreement”,  making 
special reference to articles 9, 110, 116, 234 ad 229 of the EEC Treaty. 
The  other  GATT  contracting  parties  responded  positively  to  that 
commitment,  and  accepted  the  EC  as  a  contracting  party  instead  of  just 
recognizing  it  as  a  supranational  entity  with  strong  influence  on  GATT 
negotiations. Starting in 1960, contracting parties negotiated directly with the 
EC, not with their member States. Even in the case when dispute settlements 
referred to a single European State, proceedings were stated against the EC as a 
contracting party (Petersmann, 1986, p. 23). The EC were  de facto a GATT 
contracting party. 
As it has already been mentioned, the 1967 Geneva Protocol established a 
precedent in the recognition of other actors in the WTO. This was shown again 
in the 1979 Geneva Protocol to the General Agreement that embodied the results 
of  the  Tokyo  Round.  In  that  protocol,  schedules  of  the  different  European 
countries were collected in a single document for the European Communities
6, 
referring to the Benelux, the EEC and the ECSC member States as a group.  
 
2.2. The European Communities recognition as a contracting party at the 
WTO and mixed membership 
The fact that even dispute settlements were directed to the EC shows the 
extent to which the EC were accepted as a contracting party by other members 
of the GATT. The European Communities were not a contracting party to the 
GATT. Only the EC member States were. But, as the Geneva 1979 Protocol 
showed, the EC had progressively acquired the status of a contracting party to all 
intents and purposes. Ever since then, all agreements and protocols negotiated 
according  to  the  GATT  rules  have  been  open  for  acceptance  by  contracting 
parties  to  the  GATT  and  by  the  EEC  (or  EC).Actually,  since  1970,  most 
agreements negotiated in the GATT framework have been accepted by the EC, 
without acceptance by the EC member States as such (Bourgeois, 2001). 
This recognition of the EC membership proved to be useful in legal terms, 
since many disputes were referred to EC countries. In that sense, an important 
                                                 
5 Baron Snoy d’Oppuers, speaking on behalf of the EEC States to the Intersessional Committee of 
the GATT Contracting Parties in 1957, GATT document IC/SR, p. 39. 
6 GATT, Geneva Protocol to the General Agreement o Tariffs and Trade (Tokyo Round), vol, IV, 
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part of the Dillon Round and the Kennedy Round negotiations was focused on 
the resolution of problems resulting from the Common Customs Tariff and the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC
7. In fact, the compatibility of the EEC’s 
commercial regime with the GATT was frequently questioned. That was the case 
of some differences regarding the interpretation of article XXIV of the GATT
8 or 
of the 1982 complaint by the US on the incompatibility of the EEC’s preferential 
arrangements with Mediterranean countries with the GATT
9. 
The European Communities were constitut ed in 1986, and although the 
EC were a  sui  generis  contracting  party  in  the  GATT,  the  twelve  European 
Economic Community Countries preserved their condition of contracting parties 
in the GATT as well
10. This double membership has been seen by Petersmann as 
an example of “the successful creation in the GATT practice of all necessary 
institutions  and  procedures  in  spite  of  the  lack  of  expression  of  treaty 
provisions” (Petersmann, 1986, p. 37). 
The ad hoc formula adopted in the GATT framework was to assume that 
the EC status was a mixed membership, where EC member States and the EC 
itself coexisted as GATT contracting parties. Its practical application did not 
cause  noticeable  trouble,  at  least  for  a  while,  since  other  GATT  contracting 
parties  accepted  the  situation as transitory  and  understood that the  European 
integration  process  required  flexibility.  Nevertheless,  in  the  course  of  time, 
patience  of  the  other  contracting  parties  started  to  diminish,  especially  with 
regard to the absence of a clear agreement between the EC and its member States 
on division of competences. 
2.3. The EU as a contracting party: a new name for a new reality? 
The Maastricht Treaty (1992) initiated an essential phase for the European 
integration process. Its ratification implied some relevant changes that would 
modify the WTO-EU relations.  
The Maastricht Treaty modified the European nomenclature: the European 
Communities  denomination  was  substituted  by  the  expression  “European 
Union”. The EU would cover the three European Communities – in what was 
                                                 
7 About the common agricultural policy of the EEC, see section 3. The completion of the common 
market transitional period was achieved in January 1970, and the EEC communicated the GATT 
that it was “naturally prepared to assume such obligations as a customs union and as an economic 
union in accordance with the letter and spirit of the General Agreement in the same way as all 
other contracting parties” (GATT document, C7M/61, p. 6). 
8 Accession of new members, such as Greece , to the EC, generated reports on this issue (Report 
regarding accession of Greece was adopted in 9 March 1983).  
9 Complaint by the US against “EC-Tariff treatment on imports of citrus products from certain 
countries in the Mediterranean region”, Panel Report of 1985 (L/5776). 
10 Portugal (1962), Spain (1963), Ireland (1967).  For the rest, see footnote 4.  THE EU AS AN ACTOR AT THE WTO: ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES   55 
 
called the communitarized pillar
11 –, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
pillar and the pillar on Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. 
This new name had a strong symbolic meaning, since it showed the underlying 
idea  of  going  further  with  the  political  integration  process  in  Europe.  The 
remaining question is: was the new name supported by the adequate legal and 
policy  machinery  to  achieve  that  goal?  We  will  answer  that  question  after 
studying the whole integration process, including the Treaty of Lisbon. 
In order to reach that aim -a political union- some first steps were taken in 
Maastricht. The role of the EU in international relations was strengthened, the 
first pillar was based in common policies, and some new legal instruments were 
created for the second pillar, such as common actions and common positions 
(Gutierrez  Espada,  Cervell,  Piernas,  Garciandía,  2012).  At  that  time,  the 
Uruguay  Round  was  close  to  its  end,  and  the  creation  of  the  World  Trade 
Organization by the Marrakesh Agreement was imminent. The new EU took that 
opportunity to agree that the EC would be a legally recognized WTO member. 
However, it did not decide that this new membership would replace EC member 
states  as  contracting  parties.  The  Commission  understood  that  too  many 
controversial issues were already being faced after the Maastricht Treaty and that 
it was smarter not to make this decision in that context
12.  
Article XI of the Marrakesh Agreement recognized the EC member States 
and the EC as original members of the WTO. The other WTO contracting parties 
accepted that position, understanding the aforementioned context. However, it 
was not clear whether their support would last forever.  
The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice followed the tendency inaugurated 
by Maastricht, with the purpose of deepening the political integration process. 
Finally,  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  constituted  the  milestone  of  that  process, 
articulating mechanisms that may enable this goal to be really achievable.  The 
EU was finally recognized legal personality in article 47 of the Treaty on the 
European Union declaring in a Primary Law norm what was already accepted de 
facto, as the European Parliament stated in its resolution on the legal personality 
of  the  European  Union
13. This legal perso nality allows the EU to subscribe 
international agreements as a subject of International Law. 
The Treaty of Lisbon contained another key innovation regarding the 
relation between the EU and the WTO: the creation of the  High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and of the European External Action 
                                                 
11 Common Trade Policy and competence on trade were included in this first pillar. Therefore, the 
EU continued to be referred in the GATT as EC. 
12 See Council Decision of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the 
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the 
Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986 -1994) (OJEC L/336, 23 December 1994).  
13  European  Parliament  resolution  on  the  legal  personality  of  the  European  Union 
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Service. In order to allow the EU to speak with one voice in external affairs, 
Catherine Ashton inaugurated the position of High Representative, supported by 
the  European  External  Action  Service
14, a complex organizational apparatus 
composed by personnel from the European Comm ission, the Council of the 
European Union, and diplomatic services of European member States
15. 
At present, it is mainly the European Commission who negotiates at the 
WTO on behalf of the European Union, representing it in the WTO General 
Council
16. It coordinates with the EU member States trough the Trade Policy 
Committee, and follows the guidelines stated by member States in the Council of 
Ministers, in order to better represent and protect European interests
17. The 
signature of international agreements requires authorization of the Council and 
European Parliament. 
Nevertheless, the membership of European States at the WTO needs to be 
kept in mind. In spite of the institutional efforts of the Commission and the 
Council for coordination with the States, a stro nger coordination might be 
needed in particular circumstances. The role of the High Representative and the 
European External Action Service is relevant in that sense, especially in what 
concerns the Union Delegations. 
The Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the 
European External Action Service regulates the creation of Union Delegations
18, 
a new figure derived from the pre -existing Commission Delegations
19. For 
decades, the EU has had a Commission Delegation in Geneva to deal wit h 
international organizations. However, the volume of the WTO negotiations 
motivated  that  the  High  Representative  created  a  new  European  Union 
Delegation in Geneva to deal with WTO issues: the Permanent Mission of the 
                                                 
14 She was designated for the position by Dec. 2009/880/EU, OJEU L315/49, 2.12.2009. 
15 About this new apparatus, see Cardwell, P. J., EU external relations law and policy in the post-
Lisbon era, T. M. C. Asser Press, The Hague, 2012, 433 pp. 
16 It also represents the EU in other formations of the General Council such as the Dispute 
Settlement Body and the Trade Policy Review Body. The Commission also represents th e EU in 
subsidiary WTO bodies such as the Council for Trade in Goods or the Committee for Trade and 
the Environment.  
17 Protection of those interests requires sometimes consultation to the European Economic and 
Social Committee. Also, the Commission has the  obligation to inform the European Parliament of 
negotiations at the WTO.  
18 Article 5 of the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organization and functioning 
of the European External Action Service (2010/427/EU, OJEU L201/30, 3.08.2010) state s that the 
decision to open or close a delegation shall be adopted by the High Representative, in agreement 
with the Council and the Commission..  
19 Note of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU on The High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service, November 2009, 
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EU to the WTO
20. The Delegation represents the interests of the European Union 
and its 27 Member States in the area of multilateral trade, and negotiates on their 
behalf at the WTO; coordinates the positions of the European Union and its 27 
Member States for multilateral trade negotiations; and  promotes the visibility 
and  understanding  of  the  European  Union's  trade  policy  through  contacts, 
information  activities  and  networking  with  other  diplomatic  missions  and 
Geneva-based international organizations, bodies and agencies
21. 
The competences of the Permanent Mission in trade show how the Treaty 
of Lisbon has contributed with very useful instruments to a better representation 
of the EU at the WTO. However, the Permanent Mission and the  European 
External Action Service are at an early stage of their  development. Time will 
confirm whether this tendency towards a stronger common position within the 
EU will be consolidated or not. Besides,  mixed membership keeps being a 
challenge for the EU, as will be confirmed when analyzing the division of 
competences. 
 
3. Division of competences in the EU and its consequences for trade issues 
Recognition of the EU as a legitimate contracting party in the WTO meant 
an  improvement  in  its  situation  compared  to  the  now  obsolete  de  facto 
recognition. However, as noted above, the dual membership regime maintained 
even after that legal recognition – EU and European member States –  set out a 
controversy, especially regarding the division of competences in the EU.  
European Primary Law states trade as an exclusive competence of the 
European Union. Nevertheless, before Lisbon, some other matters linked to the 
WTO norms remained in the sphere of authority of European member States. 
This unclear division of some competencies was aggravated by the lack of a 
code or regulation clarifying the borderline situations.  
This issue was of vital relevance, mainly for two reasons. On the one 
hand,  a  distinction  is  needed  between  the  European  Union  competences  and 
those of member States in order to know who had to exercise each of them, 
internally and externally (with third countries). That was the case of negotiations 
with the WTO, where clarification was essential for an adequate development of 
roles  in  that  particular  international  organization  and  in  its  negotiations. 
Otherwise, European and national interests would hardly be protected. 
                                                 
20 Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
on the Establishment of an EU Delegation to the UN in Geneva (Brussels, 26.5.2010 COM(2010) 
287 final) considered it was convenient to split in two delegations the existing Delegation in 
Geneva, one for UN matters and the other one for WTO issues. 
21  It was created in January 2011. The role of the Delegation can be consulted at URL: 
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On the other hand, the existence of two different levels of competence –  
European and national – determined the legal nature of the agreements reached 
within the WTO framework. That is the origin of their characterization as mixed 
agreements.  The  special  nature  of  these  mixed  agreements  makes  them  an 
interesting object of analysis because of the theoretical challenges they offer to 
the legal discipline, and because distinct legal effects derive from that mixed 
nature.  
In this section, the division of competences in trade between the EU and 
its member States is analyzed. The nature of mixed agreements is also studied, 
being mainly focused on its legal effects. 
 
3.1. Different types of competences in the EU and the Common Trade Policy 
Before Lisbon, division of competences was unclear and dispersed along 
the Treaties. The Treaty of Lisbon contributed to the clarification of this issue, 
distinguishing  between  exclusive  competences,  shared  competences  and 
supporting competences
22. Exclusive competences are regulated in article 3 of 
the TFEU, and only the EU is able to legislate and adopt binding acts in those 
matters. Shared competences are regulated in article 4 of the same Treaty and are 
to be adopted by the EU a nd member States, but not simultaneously; Member 
States will exercise them only as far as the EU has not exercised them, or has 
decided not to exercise them. Principles of proportionality and subsidiarity need 
to be regarded when exercising those competenc es
23. Finally, in supporting 
competences
24 the main role is played by member States. The EU role in those 
competences is to support, coordinate or complement their actions (Chalmers, 
Davies, Monti, 2010). 
                                                 
22 Competences in the EU could also be classified as explicit, implicit and subsidiary. Explicit 
competences are those explicitly recognized in the Treaties. The doctrine of implicit competences 
developed by the jurisprudence of the ECJ states that some competences are to be exercised by the 
EU, even if they were not explicitly recognized in Treaties. The effect of this doctrine in the WTO-
EU relations is recognition to the EU of international trade competences at the external level. 
Subsidiary competences are based on the “flexibility clause” stated in article 352 of the TFEU. 
This article allows the EU to exercise competences that were not attributed regularly by member 
States to the EU, in the case where this exercise is considered as necessary to achieve the EU 
goals.  
The distinction of explicit, implicit and subsidiary competences shows the different mechanisms 
used by the EU to achieve its objectives in trade, internally and externally. The experience of 
sharing with its member states the condition of WTO contracting parties had a strong influence in 
this tendency to broaden its scope. 
23 Note that the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality is 
applicable (16.12.2004, OJEU, C 310/207).  
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Article 3.1.e) of the TFEU classifies the common commercial policy as an 
EU exclusive competence
25. Based on this norm, the EU has developed a strong 
Common Commercial Policy that has become a key aspect of its policy and 
institutional activity. Measures and decisions have been taken regarding exports, 
liberalized and non liberalized imports, and defensive measures against dumping 
or counterfeiting.  
Given the global nature of commercial transactions, an important aspect 
of the CCP is the signature of agreements with third countries, especially at the 
WTO, such as commercial agreements, agreements for limitation of exports, and 
cooperation agreements. Those agreements regulate different sectors,  such  as 
agriculture, services, and intellectual property rights. We must be aware of the 
difficulty that this implies: the EU has an exclusive competence on common 
commercial policy, but this policy may be regulating a sector where the EU 
competence is of a different nature. That is the case of agriculture or transports 
(as part of the agreement on services), recognized  by the Treaty of Lisbon as 
shared competences
26; also, tourism is classified as a supporting competence
27. 
The diversity of competence types related to trade has been the origin of some 
difficulties in the EU-WTO framework, as will be seen below, since some of the 
agreements were of a mixed nature, i.e., the TRIPS (Trade -related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights) or the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in 
Services) agreements. 
Taking that problem into account, the Treaty of Lisbon also contributed to 
the clarification of this situation with a key norm: article 207 of the TFEU. This 
article states that “the common commercial policy shall be based on uniform 
principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of 
tariff  and  trade  agreements  relating  to  trade  in  goods  and  services,  and  the 
commercial  aspects  of  intellectual  property,  foreign  direct  investment,  the 
achievement  of  uniformity  in  measures  of  liberalisation,  export  policy  and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or 
subsidies”. This norm expressly recognizes the European Union an exclusive 
competence on the most common negotiation fields at the WTO, considerably 
reducing the use of mixed agreements. 
Some  exceptions  have  been  made  to  this  general  rule  regarding 
“intellectual  property,  foreign  direct  investment”,  “trade  in  cultural  and 
audiovisual services” where a prejudice might be caused to the Union’s cultural 
and  linguistic  diversity,  and  trade  in  “social,  education  and  health  services”, 
where an agreement could risk seriously disturbing the national organization of 
such  services  and  prejudicing  the  responsibility  of  Member  States  to  deliver 
                                                 
25 This is coherent with the objective of “free and fair trade” established in article 3.5 of the TEU. 
26 Article 4.2 d) and 4.g) of the TFEU.  
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them
28. In those cases, mixed agreements are used, and this remains a challenge 
for the EU and member States. 
 
3.2. Mixed agreements: legal nature and effects 
An agreement with the WTO may be mixed in two senses. Firstly, it may 
contain  norms  on  subject-matters  characterized  as  different  types  of 
competences for the EU. Secondly, parties to the agreement are the EU and 
European member States at the same time.  
Mixed  agreements  are  the  legal  mechanism  used  by  the  EU  and  its 
member  States,  “when  it  appears  that  the  subject-matter  of  an  agreement  or 
contract falls in part within the competence of the EU (Community, in original 
text) and in part within that of the Member States”
29. Without this mechanism, 
every  time  an  agreement  has  to  be  signed  at  the  WTO,  the  difficulty  of 
determining whether the EU or its member States are competent on the subject-
matter  would  cause  paralysis.  Instead  of  trying  to  clarify  doubt,  mixed 
agreements  evade  controversy  enabling  member  States  to  operate  under  the 
umbrella of the EU capacity to subscribe international treaties on commercial 
issues
30. 
Looking at the legal effects of mixed agreements, from a careful reading 
of the Treaties, it can be inferred that international agreements made by the 
European Union are subordinated to Primary Law, and prevail over Secondary 
Law. Article 218.11 of the TFEU states that: “a member State, the European 
Parliament, the Council or the Commission may obtain the opinion of the Court 
of Justice as to whether an agreement envisaged is compatible with the Treaties”. 
Moreover, article 216.2 of the TFEU recognizes that “agreements concluded by 
the Union are binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its member 
States”. 
The effects of the mixed agreements will differ according to whether the 
relevant articles of the agreement pertain to European Law or fall under the 
competence  of  the  individual  States.  The  norms  pertaining  to  European  law 
become  part  of  the  European  legal  system  from  the  moment  the  agreement 
enters into force. The norms falling under national competences will become 
part of the European legal system either directly or through a national norm, 
according  to  what  the  national  law  states  in  that  respect  (Cebada,  2002). 
Jurisdiction  of  the  European  Court  of  Justice  on  the  agreements  is  still  a 
                                                 
28 Transports are referred to in another part of the Treaties, in order to ensure policy coherence. 
29 Opinion 2/91 (ILO Convention concerning the Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work), 1993, 
ECR I-1061, para. 36).  
30 Some references about mixed agreements may be found in O'Keeffe  and Schermers (eds.), 
Mixed Agreements, Kluwer, The Hague, 1983. Bourgeosi, Dewost Gaiffe (eds.), La communaut￩ 
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controversial issue. A part of the doctrine considers that its jurisdiction is limited 
to clauses of a mixed agreement that do not extend beyond the EU’s field of 
operation, and other parts understand the Court may interpret agreements in their 
entirety
31. 
Regarding the issues that might derive from the legal nature of mixed 
agreements, it seemed that respect of the principle of sincere cooperation
32 
required the adoption of a Code of Conduct that would regulate the division of 
competencies in the field and execution of the mixed agreements. In 1994, the 
Permanent  Representatives  Committee  draf ted  a  Code  of  Conduct  for  the 
Council, member States and the Commission, relating to negotiations after the 
Uruguay Round on financial services. It was approved and entered into force in 
1994 and it was used until 1997, when those negotiations ended. At a  broader 
level, many attempts were made to adopt a Code of conduct defining the 
participation of the EU and its Member States in areas of shared power at the 
WTO. However, it was difficult to achieve consensus between member States, 
the Council and the Commission (Bl￡zquez Navarro, 2007).  
  Notwithstanding the lack of a Code of conduct, the EU and its member 
States  have  learned  from  the  past  and  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  regulation  of 
competences has contributed to an improvement in their exercise, as was shown 
with regard to the content of article 207 of the TFEU. 
 
4. The EU position in negotiation rounds: the agricultural sector 
The last section of this paper goes beyond legal and institutional aspects 
of the EU-WTO relationship. Its aim is to offer the reader an overview of the 
position maintained by the EU in commercial policy for the agricultural sector. 
Since the creation of the WTO at the Uruguay Round, many negotiation 
rounds have taken place. Cities such as Singapore, Doha, Hong Kong, Geneva 
and  Cancun  have  witnessed  WTO  ministerial  conferences  where  contracting 
parties,  including  the  EU  and  its  member  states,  have  negotiated  terms  of 
liberalization of trade. Those negotiations focused in different sectors, such as 
services, raw materials, agriculture or intellectual property rights.  
                                                 
31 Bourgeois, J. H. J., The European Court of Justice and the WTO: Problems and Challenges, in 
J.  H.  H.  Weiler  (Ed.),  The  EU,  the  WTO  and  the  NAFTA.  Towards  a  Common  Law  of 
International Trade, Collected courses of the Academy of European Law, vol. IX/1, Oxford 
University Press, Academy of European Law, European University Institute, pp. 71-123, pp. 81-
82; Arnull, A., Does the Court of Justice Have Inherent Jurisdiction?, 27 CML Review, 1990, 683-
708. Some relevant cases in this field are Les Verts v. European Parliament (1986, ECR 1339, 
CJEC Judgment of 23 April, 1986) and Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Societ￠ 
Petrolifera Italiana (SPI) and SpA Michelin Italiana (SAMI), (1983, ECR 801, CJEC Judgment of 
16 March 1983). 
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The goal of the EU to be able to speak with one voice is not only a matter 
of legal or institutional instruments. Those might help. But for the content of the 
European  trade  strategy  to  be  common,  integration  needs  to  be  achieved  in 
economic and social variables.  
In  the  subsections  below,  the  position  of  the  EU  on  agricultural 
negotiations  at the WTO  is  reviewed. As  it  has  been  seen  in  Section  3,  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  constitutes  one  of  the  main  policies  and  legal 
sectors  in  the  European  Union.  Besides,  as  stated  below,  the  common 
agricultural  policy  has  been  defined  by  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  as  a  shared 
competence and therefore the adoption of a common position for all European 
member States remains a challenge. 
  First, the Uruguay Round that led to the creation of the WTO is analyzed. 
Second, some details of the European position on the Doha Round negotiations 
are offered.  
 
4.1. The Uruguay Round 
The  GATT  contracting  parties spent almost  eight  years  in  negotiations 
under the Uruguay Round framework, dealing with very diverse matters, such as 
tariffs,  non-tariff  barriers,  natural  resource  products,  textiles,  agriculture  or 
intellectual property. Those efforts culminated in the creation of the WTO. A 
new  era  began  for  international  trade,  in  the  framework  of  the  rules  agreed 
during those eight years of negotiations and by the adopted policies.  
The European Union, as one of the main contracting parties at the WTO, 
had a strategy for the Round, based on the defense of European interests and 
determined by the objectives set by the Treaties in each sector. Agriculture was 
one of the most difficult sectors in those negotiations.  
The  European  Union  negotiated  agricultural  matters  in  the  WTO 
determined  by  the  internal  Common  Agricultural  Policy
33.  In  the  Geneva 
meeting,  gradual  and  substantial  reductions  in  agricultural  support  and 
protection  were  set  as  a  long -term  objective.  The  European  Community 
supported  gradual  cuts  in  agricultural  support,  based  on  an  aggregate 
measurement of support (AMS), that would serve to calculate support schemes 
and define their reduction. However, that proposal did not receive support from 
other actors as the Cairns Group, the United States or Japan. 
The EU was accused of being responsible for the Hey sel Conference 
(1990) failure, because it did not accept the demands of the majority of the 
                                                 
33 In 1985, just before the first meeting of the Uruguay Round in Punta del Este, the third reform of 
the CAP had taken place. The next reform would be implemented in 1992, during the Uruguay 
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participating countries
34. In 1992, the European Union implemented the fourth 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, incorporating the forecasted results 
of the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round finally included an Agreement on 
Agriculture adopted in 1993, thus regulating market access, domestic support 
and export competition. 
The European Commission defined the 1992 reform as a first step to 
prepare the EU agriculture for the future, based on three main aspects: forecasted 
budgetary  problems,  enlargement  of  the  EU  towards  the  East,  and  the 
negotiations context at the WTO. In that sense, it stated that it would be 
“increasingly important for the EU’s agriculture to be competitive and it must 
have a policy which provides the right conditions for this”. The need for that 
change  towards  a  more  competitive  sector  was  determined  by  negotiations 
aimed at reducing support and protection in agriculture, expected for 2000
35. 
Within that context, the Commission stated in its strategy document 
“Agenda  2000”  that  the  EU  would  have  to  rely  a  lot  less  on  price  support 
mechanisms in the future; increase incentives for farmers to contribute to the 
protection of the environment and to the protection of the European countryside; 
achieve  a  competitive  and  environment-friendly  agriculture;  and  keep  rural 
communities as a fundamental part of the European model of society. The idea 
was to create the conditions for EU farmers and the EU food industry to be in a 
good position to take advantage of the change when it happened
36.  
The Uruguay Round could be evaluated as successful for the European 
Union  regarding  the  double  membership  and  competence  issues  because, 
notwithstanding the legitimacy problems of the EC in the WTO, the European 
position was presented unanimously at the negotiation processes.  
 
4.2. The Doha Round 
The Doha Round is the ongoing challenge for the European Union in that 
same sense. Now that the Treaty of Lisbon has articulated some institutional 
reforms promoting, at least in theory, a common position of the European Union 
and its member States at the WTO, negotiations in the Doha Round give the 
European Union an opportunity to show how efficient these mechanisms work at 
the policy level. 
During  the  Doha  Round  negotiations,  denominated  as  the  Round  for 
Development,  the  European  Union  has  shown  a  clear  commitment  to 
development  and  environment  through  trade.  It  has  also  stated  its  belief  in 
                                                 
34  European  Parliament,  “External  agricultural  policy:  agricultural  agreements  under 
GATT/WTO”, Fact Sheets, 24/04/2001. 
35 European Commission,  World Trade: Global Partnership, Global Opportunities, 1998. 
36 European Commission, “Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union” (COM(97) 2000), 
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multilateral  liberalization  and  rule-making.  Among  the  objectives  that  the 
European Commission has established for the Doha negotiations, the creation of 
trade flows with growing emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India 
could be highlighted. The European Union also wants to improve access to the 
services market
37.  
Agriculture is an essential subject-matter in the Doha Round. Difficulties 
in achieving agreements in that and other sectors have created a general feeling 
of failure among the contracting parties. Those difficulties will hop efully be 
overcome with political will and negotiation efforts. However, the Doha Agenda 
is of a global nature and that means that, for the Round to be concluded, 
agreements  must  be  achieved  in  every  sector,  including  agriculture.  The 
interconnected character of diverse sectors’ negotiations is a new aspect of WTO 
agreements (Millet, García-Dur￡n, 2006, p. 95). 
At  first,  the  Common Agricultural  Policy  was  seen  as  an  obstacle  for 
progress on the Doha negotiations, since export subsidies, domestic support and 
control of access to markets protected the EU farmers. However, its reform in 
2003 showed the EU commitment to eliminate tariffs and other barriers. In fact, 
during negotiations, the EU offered to cut farm tariffs by 60%, reduce trade 
distorting farm subsidies by 80%, and eliminate farm export subsidies altogether. 
Negotiations continued and the EU assumed compromises that would be 
difficult to fulfill with the 2003 CAP. Therefore, new reforms were needed in 
order to achieve international objectives. In 2008, a new reform of the CAP tried 
to modernize the sector and make it more market-oriented. At present, a new 
reform  is  being  discussed  after  the  presentation  of  a  legal  proposal  by  the 
Commission. The main idea of the proposal is to make the CAP more effective 
by increasing the competitiveness and the sustainability of the sector
38. 
In general, it could be said that the European Union is acting as a real 
union in the WTO during the Doha Round negotiations, and that it is acting 
coherently both internally and externally. The Treaty of Lisbon has contributed 
to this unity, with some of the aforementioned reforms. It is interesting to note 
for example the role the European Parliament adopted in commercial issues on 
agriculture since its entry into force. Playin g that role, by resolution to the 
Council the 8
th March 2011, the EP “calls on the Commission to comply strictly 
with its negotiating mandate from the Council, which sets the most recent reform 
of the CAP as the limit of its action, provided that equivalent concessions are 
obtained from its trading partners; asks it to refrain from making any proposals 
                                                 
37 URL: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/eu-and-wto/doha/. 
38 The proposal was presented on October 12, 2011 and could be approved by the end of 2013. It 
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that would predetermine the decisions to be made on the future of the CAP post-
2013”
39. 
The new role of the EP shows the extent to which the Treaty of Lisbon 
and other reforms at the European Union have contributed to the consolidation 
of the EU as a contracting party to the WTO, speaking with one voice. Some 
aspects  of  the  division  of  competences  with  member  States  are  still 
controversial. However, the EU and its member States have developed useful 
mechanisms and have shown a strong will to work in a successful partnership. 
We  will  have  to  wait  to  see  whether  other  new  agents  such  as  the  Geneva 
Delegation are also useful. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The WTO constitutes, together with the IMF and the World Bank, the 
institutional economic framework at the international level. Sovereign States are 
still the most important subjects of international law and of the aforementioned 
international organizations. Nevertheless, in response to a globalized world and 
economy, integration processes have been generalized in the last decades.  
The European Union is the result of one of those integration processes, the 
origin of which goes back to the Schumann Declaration in the 1950’s. What 
started as a group of States with some common norms is now an international 
organization with legal personality that aspires to become a political union and is 
legitimized  to  subscribe  international  agreements  with  other  States  and 
international organizations.  
Its consolidation in the WTO as a contracting party, in parallel with the 
membership of its member States, presents some particular characteristics with 
legal effects which have been analyzed in this paper.  
It can be concluded from the study that the evolution of the European 
integration process has contributed to a better participation of the EU in the 
WTO, the Treaty of Lisbon being the greatest exponent of that contribution, 
although some challenges regarding division of competencies or the legal nature 
of mixed agreements remain unresolved.  
Some years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it would be 
desirable that the EU and its member States open an internal discussion on the 
double  membership  issue  and  decide  whether  it  is  better  that  only  the  EU 
represents  European  interests  at  the  WTO,  or  whether  the  current  situation 
should be maintained. 
 
                                                 
39 European Parliament resolution of March 8, 2011 on EU agriculture and international trade 
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